

TAB

SOME ASPECTS OF STALIN'S DECLARATION TO THE CLOSING SESSION OF THE
NINETEENTH CONGRESS OF THE ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY (15 October)

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Stalin's declaration directing (foreign) Communist Parties to join democratic parties in popular fronts and urging these parties to seek success by unfurling the standard of "bourgeois democratic freedoms" seems to be directed towards a central Communist effort for the future which has as its aims:

1. Revival, in a rather different form, of the popular front days of the 1930's. In this case, however, the aim seems to be collaboration for a negative (i. e., neutralism) rather than a positive action.

This is supported by and has undoubtedly been influenced by the following European trends:

a. Increase in strength and influence in the Bevan wing of the British Labour Party combined with Bevan's, Ian Mikardo and co's increasing emphasis on non-cooperation with the United States.

b. Growth in power of the Italian Communist Party (note the recent election) and the increased possibility that Socialists and others may be induced to cooperate with the Italian CP if the temptation can be sufficiently sugar-coated.

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*2 copies made 11-18-52
1 cc to Mr Kelly 11-19-52*

c. The increasing "neutralist" tendencies in France. Here one must consider not only the breaking of Marty and Tillon, but also the greater danger of the possible use of respected elder statesmen (in a popular front appeal) such as Herriot. Herriot sees himself, and no doubt with the best intentions, as a bridge between East and West. One can easily imagine the use which a well played and cleverly propagandized Communist peace and popular front program could make in such a situation.

2. A continuation of the cold war against the West and especially the United States.

This would seem to be borne out by:

a. The success of measures short of hot war in the post World War II period. Stalin, always a practical man, does not seem disposed to bring things to a boil when they are simmering nicely. In Iran, the Tudeh is not losing ground and it is difficult to discover serious reversals in Soviet unconventional warfare elsewhere in the world. Stalin, as all his biographers note, is patient and such patience has the further virtue of suiting Stalinist-Communist theory.

b. The down-grading of certain rather high-

ranking military people.* This would seem to support the continued emphasis on cold war as would Sections 65 and 66 of the draft of the new statute for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. These two sections emphasize, I believe, even greater political-ideological control over the military in the U. S. S. R.

Finally, Malenkov's statements before the Nineteenth Party Congress seem to underscore, by extension and elaboration, what Stalin put in simplified form. Thus, Malenkov emphasized:

1. Britain in danger from her "friend", the United States, who was engaged in taking her markets and had further made the British Isles a gigantic aircraft carrier.
2. The existence of "more sober and progressive political figures in European and capitalist countries" who are not going to be blinded by anti-Soviet policy and who will find a road open towards a new peaceful, democratic path.
3. The peace movement of the future is to be democratic in character and can attract all kinds of people since its goal is not socialism. Thus war can be successfully prevented.

Conclusions

1. The United States, more than ever, is the target.
2. Cold war to continue, but more carefully and softly, softly so as not to disturb the timid and those with coexistence ideas.
3. Popular front techniques as spelled out in Par. 1 of page 1.

* The New York Times, October 16, 1952.